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THE SUPREME COURT'S BIPOLAR
APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION

OF 18 U.S.C. § 1503 AND
18 U.S.C. § 2232(c)
United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995)
I.

INTRODUCrION

In UnitedStates v. Aguilar,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled
on questions regarding the limits of the Omnibus Clause of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503,2 which prohibits a person from endeavoring to obstruct or
impede the due administration ofjustice, and the limits of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2232(c),3 which prohibits a person from disclosing a government
wiretap to the person targeted under the wiretap. Regarding the Omnibus Clause, the Court held that making false statements to an investigating agent who may or may not testify before a grand jury does not
violate the statute.4 In reaching its conclusion, the Court used the
1 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995).
2 The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994) reads:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petitjuror, or officer
in or of any court of the United State, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States commissioner [United States magistrate judge] or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures
any such grand or petitjuror in his person or property on account of any verdict or
indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror,
or injures any such officer, commissioner [United States magistrate judge], or other
committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his
official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
§ 1503 is divided into two parts: (1) its specific language, which forbids influencing, intimidating or impeding any witness,juror or court official, and (2) the Omnibus Clause, which
punishes efforts to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice.
United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 884
(1978).
3 The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c) (1994) reads:
Whoever, having knowledge that a Federal investigative or law enforcement officer has
been authorized or has applied for authorization under chapter 119 to intercept a
wire, oral, or electronic communication, in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such
interception, gives notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception to any
person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
4 Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2362.
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rule of lenity to place a new limit-the nexus requirement-on the
Omnibus Clause. 5 Under the nexus requirement, a violation of the
Omnibus Clause does not occur unless a person's efforts have the
"natural and probable", consequence of obstructing justice. 6 Regarding § 2232 (c), the Court held that a person can violate the statute by
disclosing an expired wiretap. 7 The Court based its interpretation on
the plain language of § 2232(c). 8
The Note argues that the Court reached the correct results regarding both statutory questions. The Court, however, should have
used different reasoning regarding its interpretation of the Omnibus
Clause of § 1503. First, this Note argues that the Court should not
have used the rule of lenity to place a new limit-the "nexus requirement"-on the Omnibus Clause. Both the plain language of the Omnibus Clause and prior Supreme Court decisions make it clear that
the statute is not violated by making false statements to a person when
there is only a mere possibility that the person might testify at ajudicial proceeding. Second, this Note argues that the Court's interpretation of the plain language of § 2232(c) is correct; a person can violate
the statute by disclosing an expired wiretap. Furthermore, this interpretation is also consistent with congressional intent behind § 2232 (c)
to protect the secrecy of government wiretaps. An investigation may
contain several wiretaps including both existing and expired wiretaps.
Thus, protecting the secrecy of the expired wiretaps also protects the
secrecy of the existing wiretaps.
II.
THE HISTORY OF §

A.

BACKGROUND

1503

1.

The Origin of § 1503

The language of § 1503 dates back to the Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73,
83. 9 The Act of 1789 provided that federal courts of the United States
"shall have power.., to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing
before the same."' 0 Due to the broad language of the statute, it was
not long before some federal judges began abusing their authority
under it. The most notable case involved James H. Peck, a federal
5 Id.

6 Id.
7 Id. at 2364.
8 Id.

9 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45 (1941).
10

Id.
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district judge." Judge Peck had imprisoned and disbarred an attorney for publishing critical remarks regarding one of Judge Peck's
opinions.' 2 In response to Judge Peck's action, the House of Representatives initiated impeachment proceedings against him.' 3 However, on January 28, 1831, by a vote of twenty-one to twenty, the
4
Senate acquitted Judge Peck.'
Despite its unsuccessful bid to impeach Judge Peck, Congress decided that it needed to sharply delineate the broad undefined powers
of the inferior courts under the Act of 1789.' 5 As a result, Congress
passed a bill that became known as the Act of March 2, 1831.16 This
Act, which was titled "[a] n Act declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court," contained two sections.' 7 In Section 1,18 Congress
narrowly defined the criminal cases that could be tried using summary
punishment.' 9 These criminal cases involved contempts of court occurring within or near the vicinity of the courtroom. 20 Under Section 2,21 which was added by the Senate as an amendment to
Section 1,22 Congress defined a much broader category of criminal
cases involving contempts of court occurring outside the courtroom. 23
Under this section, however, a person could be punished only after
indictment and trial by jury.24 Forty years later, the Supreme Court
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 7 CONG. DEB. 1830-31 (1837).

Nye, 313 U.S. at 45.
Id. at 46.
'7 Id.
18 Section 1 of the Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487 reads:
That the power of the several courts of the United States to issue attachments and
inflict summary punishments for contempts of court, shall not be construed to extend
to any cases except the [misbehavior] of any person or persons in the presence of the
said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration ofjustice, the [misbehavior] of any of the officers of the said courts in their official transactions, and the
disobedience or resistance by any officer of the said courts, party,juror, witness, or any
other person or persons, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command
of the said courts.
19 Nye, 313 U.S. at 47-49.
20 Id.
21 Section 2 of the Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487 reads, in part:
That if any person or persons shall corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavour to
influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the
United States, in the discharge of his duty, or shall, corruptly, or by threats or force,
obstruct, or impede, or endeavour to obstruct or impede, the due administration of
justice therein, shall be liable to persecution therefor ....
22 Walter Nelles & Carol Weiss King, Contempt By Publication in the United States, 28
'5
16

COLUM. L. REv. 525, 530-31 (1928).

23 Nye, 313 U.S. at 52.
24 See id. at 46-47.
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upheld the Act of March 2, 1831.25 The Court stated, "[a]s thus seen
the power of these courts in the punishments of contempts can only
be exercised to insure order and decorum in their presence, to secure
faithfulness on the part of their officers in their official transactions,
and to enforce obedience to their lawful orders, judgments, and
26
processes."
2.

The Evolution of § 1503

After various revisions, Congress codified Section 1 of the Act of
March 2, 1831 as 18 U.S.C. § 40127, and Section 2 as 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503.28 Regarding the statutory history of Section 2, Congress first
codified Section 2 as § 5399, then as § 135, then as § 241, and finally
as § 1503. Because of the similarity between § 1503 and its predecessor statutes, courts have looked to prior decisions by the Supreme
Court involving the predecessor statutes to determine the scope of the
Omnibus Clause of § 1503.29
In construing the predecessor statute to § 1503 (Revised Stat.
§ 5399), the Supreme Court in Pettibone v. United States30 placed two
important limitations on the interpretation of the phrase "corruptly
endeavors to obstruct the due administration of justice."3 1 First, the
PettiboneCourt ruled that such obstruction can arise only when justice
is being administered in a court of the United States.3 2 Second, to
convict a person of obstructing justice, that person must have knowledge that justice is being administered and intend to obstruct the jus3
tice being administered. 3
Building on the Supreme Court's ruling in Pettibone,lower courts
have interpreted § 1503 to apply to interference with any judicial arm
of the government including grand jury proceedings.3 4 Lower courts,
25 Ex ParteRobinson, 19 Wall. 505 (U.S. 1873).
26 Id. at 510-11.

27 The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994) entitled "Power of court" reads:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration ofjustice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
28 United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 978 (5th Cir. 1989).
29 Michael Kaplan, Annotation, Attempt to Intimidate Witness, Etc., 20 ALR Fed. 731, 734
(1974).
30 148 U.S. 197 (1893).
31 Id. at 206.

32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 960 (3d Cir. 1979).
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however, have not extended the reach of § 1503 to include obstruction of governmental agency investigations including those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).35
A more difficult question regarding the Omnibus Clause of
§ 1503 for lower courts has been the question of what acts constitute
"corrupt endeavors to obstruct the due administration of justice."3 6
The Supreme Court attempted to answer this question in Osborn v.
United States.37 In Osborn, the defendant sought to convey a bribe to a
potential juror through an intermediary who was secretly working for
the government- 8 Although it was impossible for the defendant's efforts to successfully obstruct justice, the Court ruled that the defendant violated the Omnibus Clause because he had "endeavored" to
obstructjustice. 39 The Court defined "endeavor" under the Omnibus
Clause as "any effort or essay to do or accomplish the evil purpose
that [§ 1503] was enacted to prevent."40 Furthermore, the Osborn
Court noted that to violate the Omnibus Clause, a person's endeavor
4
to obstruct justice did not have to be successful. '
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Osborn, lower courts continued to struggle with the question of which acts are "corrupt endeavors to obstruct justice,"-especially regarding acts of perjury. 42
Subsequently, a split among the circuit courts developed regarding
the correct approach to this question.
To provide a more predictable approach for determining which
acts are "corrupt endeavors to obstruct the due administration ofjustice," the Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits developed a "nexus" requirement. 43 Under the Third Circuit's definition, an endeavor must
have a relationship in time, causation or logic with the judicial proceeding.44 The Eleventh Circuit advanced the nexus requirement one
step further by requiring that a person's endeavor have the "natural
and probable effect" of interfering with the due administration ofjuscert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
Cir. 1975) (stating that one who
intentionally withholds or destroys tangible evidence which he knows to be the target of a
grand jury investigation violates the Omnibus Clause).
37 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
38 Id at 325.
35 United States v. Fayer, 573 F.2d 741, 745 (2d Cir.),
36 See United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679 (3d

39 Id at 333.

40 Id (citing United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 143 (1921)).
41 Id.

42 See United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1989) (perjury by itself does
not violate § 1503).
43 United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Thomas,
916 F.2d 647, 652 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679 (3d Cir.
1975).
44 Walasek, 527 F.2d at 679 n.12.
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tice. 45 The court based its nexus requirement on the reasoning used
by the Supreme Court in In re Michael46 regarding perjury as a contempt of court.47 The Tenth Circuit also adopted the reasoning used

by the Eleventh Circuit regarding the nexus requirement and held
that making false statements to FBI agents, who were part of a grand
jury investigation, does not violate the Omnibus Clause because the
false statements would not have the "natural and probable effect" of
48
obstructing justice.
The Fifth and the Ninth Circuits have used a broader interpretation to determine which acts are "corrupt endeavors to obstruct the
due administration ofjustice" under the Omnibus Clause. 4 9 In United
States v. Rasheed,50 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Omnibus Clause
was designed to proscribe all corrupt methods of obstructing justice. 5 1
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Williams 52 ruled that any

corrupt effort to obstruct justice violates the Omnibus Clause. 5 3 Unlike the Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth
Circuits have not applied the nexus requirement to the Omnibus
Clause. An effort to obstruct justice does not need to have the "natural and probable" effect of obstructing justice or to result in actual
obstruction ofjustice. 54 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that
reliance on In re Michael by other circuits to interpret the Omnibus
Clause was incorrect since the In re Michael Court ruled on the predecessor statute to § 401-which involves summary punishment-and
not on the predecessor statute to the Omnibus Clause of § 1503.55
THE HISTORY OF §

B.

2232(c)

Section 2232(c) was enacted as part of the Electronics Privacy Act
of 1986, which amended Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.56 Title III of the 1968 law was designed to
45 Thomas, 916 F.2d at 652.
46 326 U.S. 224 (1945). The Michael Court held that regarding perjury, "that element
(obstruction) must clearly be shown in every case where the power to punish for contempt
is exerted." Id. at 228. It should be noted that the Court made its ruling regarding the
predecessor statute to 18 U.S.C. § 401-which involves summary punishment-and not to
the predecessor statute to § 1503 which involves indictment and trial by jury. Ik at 225.
47 Thomas, 916 F.2d at 652.
48 United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 697 (10th Cir. 1993).
49 See United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 979 (5th Cir. 1989); see also United States
v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981).
50 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981).
51 Id. at 852.
52 874 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1989).
53 Id. at 979.
54 Id.
55 Id at 979-80.
56

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351 tit.
III, 82
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protect against the unauthorized interception of electronic communications by the government.5 7 Under Title III, Congress carefully delineated the circumstances under which the Government was
authorized to use electronic surveillance. 58 In subsequent years, adVances in telecommunications and computer technologies soon made
Title III "hopelessly out of date." 59 To ensure the continued protection of the public against unauthorized government surveillance in
the face of technological advances, Congress passed the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.60 In the statement portion of
the bill, Senator Thurmond wrote that the Act "represents a fair balance between the privacy expectations of American citizens and the
61
legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies."
As part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
Congress also strengthened the government's ability to use electronic
surveillance for law enforcement efforts. 62 Besides expanding the list
of felonies for which a wiretap order could be issued, Congress created criminal penalties for those who notify a target of a government
wiretap. 65 Congress added this new section creating penalties for exposing wiretaps as an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2232.6 Congress
codified the new section as § 2232 (c).65
In the Senate Report concerning § 2232(c), Senator Thurmond
defined the elements necessary for a person to violate § 2232(c).66
First, the defendant must have knowledge that the Federal law enforcement officer has been authorized or has applied for an interception order. 67 Second, the person must "engage in conduct of giving
notice of the possible interception to any person who was or is the
target of the interception." 68 Finally, the defendant must have the in69
tent to obstruct, impede or prevent the interception.
The first and only case interpreting § 2232(c) was United States v.
Stat. 197, 211-23 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to 2520; 47 U.S.C. § 604). S.
REP. No. 1064, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986).
57 Id at
58 Id.

2.

59
60

Id. at 3.

61
62

Id. at 5.
Id.

63

Id.

Id.

64 I& at 34.
65 Id.
66
67
68
69

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Aguilar.70
III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1980, ajury convicted Michael Tham, an officer of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, of embezzling funds from the local
affiliate of the Teamster's organization. 71 In July of 1987, Tham filed
a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to set aside his conviction. The motion was assigned to District Judge Weigel in the Northern District of
72
California.
Seeking to improve his chances that the motion would be
granted, Tham sought the assistance of attorney Edward Solomon and
putative mobster Abe Chapman.7 3 Tham hoped to capitalize on their
acquaintances with DistrictJudge Robert Aguilar of the Northern District of California.7 4 Solomon knew Judge Aguilar from law school,
and Chapman was distantly related to Judge Aguilar by marriage. 75
Judge Aguilar met with both Solomon and Chapman concerning
Tham's petition, and as a result Judge Aguilar spoke with Judge Wei76
gel about the matter.
Independent of Tham's embezzlement conviction, the FBI was
investigating Tham on charges of potential labor racketeering. 77 On
May 20, 1987, the FBI applied and received authorization from Chief
District Judge Peckham to install a wiretap on Tham's business
phones. 78 Chapman appeared on the application as a potential interceptee. 79 Upon the expiration of this wiretap on June 20, 1987,
Judge Peckham granted a petition by the FBI under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(8) (d) to maintain the secrecy of the wiretap.80 From their investigation of Tham for labor racketeering, the FBI learned of the
meetings between Chapman andJudge Aguilar.8 ' On August 5, 1987,

the FBI informed Judge Peckham about the meetings between Chapman and Judge Aguilar.82 Four days later, Judge Peckham saw Judge
Aguilar at an American Bar Association reception.85
70 21 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

71 United States v. Aguilar, 994 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 1993).
72 Id.
73 Id.

74 United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2360 (1995).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994).
82 Id.
83 Id,

Concerned
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about appearances of impropriety, Judge Peckham informed Judge
Aguilar that Chapman had a prior criminal record and that Chapman's name was listed in a wiretap authorization. 84 Judge Peckham
was referring to the May 20 application. 85
As part of the FBI's continuing investigation, Judge Peckham authorized two additional wiretaps on Tham's phones. 86 Judge
Peckham named Chapman as an interceptee for the periods of September 12 through October 12, 1987, and October 22, 1987 through
May 8, 1988.87 The record does not indicate thatJudge Aguilar had
any specific knowledge of these new wiretaps.8 8
On February 6, 1988, five months after his encounter with Judge
Peckham, Judge Aguilar met with Chapman at Judge Aguilar's
house. 89 As Chapman was leaving the Aguilar house, Judge Aguilar
noticed that a man was watching his home.90 Suspecting that the man
was a government agent, Judge Aguilar immediately sent a message to
Chapman informing Chapman that their meeting had been observed
and that Chapman's phones were being wiretapped. 9 1 Judge Aguilar
apparently believed, in error, that Chapman's phones were tapped in
connection with the initial May 20 application and that the initial au92
thorization was still in effect.
On April 26, 1988, a grand jury began to investigate an alleged
conspiracy by Judge Aguilar, Tham, Chapman and Solomon to influence the outcome of Tham's case. 93 Shortly afterwards, Judge Aguilar
became aware of the grand jury proceedings. 94 OnJune 22, 1988, two
FBI agents questioned Judge Aguilar regarding his involvement in the
Tham case. 9 5 Judge Aguilar asked the agents whether he was the target of a grand jury investigation. 96 One of the FBI agents responded:
"It] here is a GrandJury meeting. Convening I guess [that is] the correct word. Urn some evidence will be heard I'm... I'm sure on this
issue." 97 The FBI agents were not yet part of the grand jury investiga84

Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2360.

85 Id.

United States v. Aguilar, 994 F.2d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id.
88 Id.
89 United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
86

87

90 Id.
91 Id.

Id.
93 United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2361 (1995).
94 United States v. Aguilar, 994 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1993).
92

95

.Id.

96 Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2362.
97 Id.
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tion nor did they identify themselves to Judge Aguilar as such. 98 During the interview, Judge Aguilar lied about his participation in the
Tham case and his knowledge of the wiretap. 99
A grand jury returned an indictment against Judge Aguilar. 1°°
Judge Aguilar was then convicted by a jury of one count of endeavoring to obstruct justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and one count
of disclosing a wiretap in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c). 10 1 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the § 1503
conviction but affirmed the § 2232(c) conviction. 102
On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals reversed both convictions against Judge Aguilar. l0 3 In overturning the § 1503 conviction, the court held that Judge Aguilar did not endeavor to obstruct
10 4
the due administration of justice when he lied to the FBI agents.
The court reasoned that for a person to be convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503, that person-by "corrupt influence" or "corrupt persuasion"-must endeavor to influence, obstruct or impede the proceedings of a grand jury investigation. 10 5 The FBI agents were not acting
10 6
as part of the grand jury but as part of a separate FBI investigation.
At most, Judge Aguilar's false statements could be considered interfer07
ence with an FBI investigation, but not with a judicial proceeding.1
Interfering with a government agency's investigation is not on the
same level as endeavoring to obstruct the proceedings of a grand
10 8
jury.
Regarding § 2232(c), the court looked at the plain language of
the statute and held that interference with a "possible" wiretap interception pertained to either applications for wiretaps, or wiretaps in
progress-not expired wiretaps. 10 9 Since Judge Aguilar interfered
with an expired wiretap, the court reasoned that he could not be convicted of violating § 2232(c).1 10
Following an appeal by the United States, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether § 1503 punishes
false statements made to an investigating agent who may or may not
98 Id.
99 Aguilar, 994 F.2d at 613.
100 Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2360.
101 Id.
102 Aguilar, 994 F.2d at 626.
103 United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1487 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
104 Id. at 1483.
105 Id. at 1485.
106 Id. at 1486.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109

Id. at 1480.

110 Id. at 1482.
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testify before a grand jury, and to decide whether disclosure of a wiretap, after its authorization expires, violates § 2232(c). 1 '
IV.
A.

SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Writing for the majority,11 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist affirmed in
part and reversed in part the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision. 1 3 Regarding 18 U.S.C. § 1503, ChiefJustice Rehnquist affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's ruling, holding that making false statements to an investigating agent who might be a potential witness before a grand jury does
not violate the statute."14 Regarding 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c), however,
Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling, holding
that disclosure of a wiretap after its authorization has expired violates
5
§ 2232(c)."
1.

18 U.S.C. § 1503

In holding thatJudge Aguilar did not violate the Omnibus Clause
of § 1503, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by analyzing the statutory
language of 18 U.S.C. § 1503.116 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the first two clauses" 7 refer only to interference with or injury
to actual grand jurors, petitjurors or court officers in the discharge of
their duties. 1 8 The third clause of the statute-the Omnibus
Clause'' 9-acts as a general catchall provision prohibiting persons
from endeavoring to influence, obstruct or impede the due adminis120
tration ofjustice.
12 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist focused on prior rulings by the Court.
1] United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 571 (1994).
112 Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's

opinion.
113 United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2359-60 (1995).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2361.

117 The first two clauses of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994) state, in part
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petitjuror, or officer
... or injures any such grand or petitjuror in his person or property on account of his
being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, commissioner ....
118 Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2361.
119 The Omnibus Clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994) states, in part: "Whoever... corrupdy or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences,
obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration ofjustice, shall be fined .... "
120 AguiLar, 115 S. Ct. at 2361.
121 Id. at 2362.
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He noted that the Court in Pettibone v. United States12 2 ruled on the
structure of the predecessor statute to § 1503.123 The Pettibone Court
ruled that "a person could not be charged with obstructing or impeding the due administration ofjustice in a court unless it appears that
he knew or had notice that justice was being administered in such
court."'

24

The Pettibone Court also reasoned that a person must first

have knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial pro25
ceeding, otherwise, he lacks the necessary intent to obstructjustice.1
Recognizing the knowledge requirement stated in Pettiboneas one
limitation on the Omnibus Clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist then
looked at circuit court decisions that had placed additional limitations
on the Omnibus Clause. 126 Some circuit courts developed a nexus
requirement, in addition to the knowledge requirement, as a further
limit on the Omnibus Clause. 127 To satisfy the nexus requirement, a
person's endeavors to obstruct judicial proceedings must have a relationship in time, causation or logic with the judicial proceedings. 12 8
Put another way, the person's endeavors must have the "natural and
129
probable effect" of interfering with the proceedings.
Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted the nexus requirement developed in the circuit courts as a correct interpretation of the Omnibus
Clause. 130 He reasoned that the nexus requirement properly restrained the reach of the Omnibus Clause.' 3 1 The Court, he noted,
has traditionally used the rule of lenity to exercise restraint in assessing the reach of federal criminal statutes out of a deference to the
prerogatives of Congress, and to draw a clear line that the public can
32
understand.
Based on the nexus requirement, Chief Justice Rehnquist held
thatJudge Aguilar did not violate the Omnibus Clause.133 First, applying the knowledge requirement, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that a rational trier of fact could not conclude that Judge Aguilar
122 148 U.S. 197 (1893).
123 Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2362.
124 Pettibone 148 U.S. at 206.
125 Id.
126 Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2362.
127 Id. (citing United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679 (3d Cir. 1975)).
128 Id.
129

Id. (citing United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1990)).

130

Id.

131 Id.

132 See id. (citing Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) (giving deference to the
prerogatives of Congress); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (noting the
importance of drawing a defined line for the public)).
133 Id. at 2363.
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knew that his false statements would be provided to the grandjury.' 3 4
Furthermore, applying the nexus requirement, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that making false statements to an investigating agent
who might testify before a grand jury would not have the "natural and
probable effect" of interfering with the due administration of justice.' 3 5 The effects of making false statements to an investigating
agent who had not yet been subpoenaed or directed to appear before
a grand jury was too speculative.13 6
2.

18 U.S.C. § 2232(c)

In holding that Judge Aguilar had violated § 2232(c) by disclosing an expired wiretap, Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by
looking at the plain language of § 2232(c).1 3 7 ChiefJustice Rehnquist
divided the statute into three distinct clauses: the first clause' 3 8 defines the knowledge requirement; the second clause' 3 9 defines the intent requirement; and the third clause 1 40 defines the punishable
act.' 4 1 According to ChiefJustice Rehnquist, for an act to be criminal
under § 2232 (c), the person committing the act must have knowledge
that an officer has been authorized or has sought authorization to
intercept a communication. 42 Next, the person committing the act
must intend to obstruct, impede, or prevent such interception. 43 Finally based on the third clause, the act must be one in which a person
44
attempts to give notice of the "possible" interception.'
In analyzing the plain language of the third clause, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist ruled that a person can violate § 2232(c) by disclosing a
wiretap after its authorization expires.' 45 The phrase "possible interception" in the third clause describes the person's act that offends the
statute.14 Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that by using the word
"possible," Congress intended that a person could violate § 2232 (c) by
134 Id.
135

Id.

136 Id.
137

Id.

The first clause of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c) (1994) states, "[w]hoever, having knowledge
that a Federal investigative or law enforcement officer has been authorized or has applied
for authorization .... "
138

139

The second clause of§ 2232(c) states, "in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such

142
143

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

interception ...."
140 The third clause of § 2232(c) states, "gives notice or attempts to give notice of the
possible interception to any person shall be fined under this tite .... "
141 Aguilar, 115 S.
Ct. at 2363-64.
144
145

146 Id.
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disclosing an application for a pending wiretap. 147 Should the application be later denied, the person would still violate § 2232(c)
although the wiretap never occurred and the person did not know
that the application had been denied. 148 Consequently, Chief Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that Congress did not intend to limit the offense
to obstruction of wiretaps that are factually possible. 149 Consequently,
disclosure of a wiretap after its authorization has expired also violates
§ 2232(c) even though the interception is no longer factually
50
possible.'
To support his broad interpretation of the phrase "possible interception," Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that this interpretation of
§ 2232(c) avoids the problems associated with impossibility. 151 Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted that in prior decisions, the Court has expressed reservations about the "continuing validity [of] the doctrine
of 'impossibility,' with all its subtleties" in the law of criminal attempt. 15 2 He reasoned that a narrow interpretation of § 2232(c)
which restricts the phrase "possible interceptions" only to pending applications or authorized wiretaps would open the doors to a defendant's claims of impossibility. 53 For example, defendants could
disclose authorized wiretaps and then claim that the wiretap was im54
possible should the wiretap fail due to a mechanical breakdown.'
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that a narrow interpretation
of § 2232 (c) would conflict with both the Court's reservation with the
doctrine of impossibility and congressional intent to protect the se15 5
crecy of governmental wiretaps.
In dictum, Chief Judge Rehnquist acknowledged Justice Stevens'
argument that a broad interpretation of § 2232 (c) places no temporal
limitation on liability for expired wiretaps. 156 Thus, a defendant potentially could be prosecuted for disclosing an expired wiretap ten
years later, producing an absurd result. 15 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that although he would reserve judgment for a case that
presented this question, the statutory laws on electronic surveillance
suggested a plausible temporal limit on liability.158 Pursuant to 18
147

Id.

148
149
150
151
152
153

Id.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 2365.
Id. (citing Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966)).
Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.

156 Id. at 2364.
157 Id. at 2366 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
158 Id. at 2364.
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U.S.C. § 2518(8) (d), the authorizing judge must notify the interceptees and related parties of the wiretap within a reasonable time
after denial of the application or termination of a wiretap.' 59 Thus,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist suggested that after the judge notifies the par60
ties, liability might no longer exist.'
Finally, ChiefJustice Rehnquist addressed one last issue concerning the construction of § 2232(c).' 6 1 The respondents argued that a
broad interpretation of § 2232(c) would violate a person's First
Amendment rights.' 62 Chief Justice Rehnquist responded that government officials in sensitive confidential positions have special duties
of nondisclosure.' 63 Consequently, government officials are subject to
more stringent standards on nondisclosure than members of the public. l 6

ChiefJustice Rehnquist concluded that the government's inter-

est in protecting the secrecy of its electronic surveillance is sufficient
to justify this construction of § 2232(c), and thus this construction
65
does not violate the First Amendment.
Using a broad interpretation of § 2232(c), Chief Justice Rehnquist held that Judge Aguilar violated the statute by disclosing information regarding an expired wiretap as prohibited under the
166
statute.
B.

JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE/DISSENT

Writing separately, Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's
opinion regarding § 1503 but dissented from the majority's opinion
regarding § 2232(c).167 He reasoned that disclosure of an expired
wiretap under § 2232(c) does not violate the statute because the statute only prohibits disclosure of authorized wiretaps or applications for
168
wiretaps.
Regarding § 2232(c), Justice Stevens noted that Judge Aguilar
had been convicted of an attempt to do the impossible: interfere with
a nonexistent wiretap.' 69 According to Justice Stevens, the law does
not proscribe a criminal attempt unless the defendant's intent is accompanied by "a dangerous probability that [the unlawful result] will
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 2365.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. (citing Snepp
165 Id.
166 Id

v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam)).

167 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
168 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
169 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
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happen." 170 In this case, there was no probability that Judge Aguilar
could reveal the existence of an interception or an application for an
interception since none existed. 17 1 Furthermore, Justice Stevens
noted that a criminal statute should not be construed to criminalize
an evil intent accompanied by a harmless act. 172 Judge Aguilar com173
mitted a harmless act: disclosure of an expired wiretap.
Next, Justice Stevens reasoned that interpretation of the plain
language of § 2232(c) demonstrates that the statute can be violated
only by disclosure of either a pending application or an authorized
wiretap, but not by disclosure of an expired wiretap. 1 74 He noted that
the second clause of § 2232(c) requires that a person intend to impede "such interception."' 175 The phrase "such interception" refers to
a person's knowledge that a federal officer "has been authorized or
has applied for authorization" to make a wiretap. 176 Thus, the interceptions that Congress intended to protect from illegal disclosure
were either pending applications for interceptions or authorized interceptions. 177 Justice Stevens reasoned further that to infer from the
statutory language-as the majority did-that defendants should be
held liable for expired authorizations or subsequent reauthorizations
would undermine the knowledge requirement of § 2232(c).1 78 Holding a defendant liable for conjectural or nonexistent authorizations
would contradict the Court's usual practice of giving strict effect to
179
scienter provisions.
Finally, Justice Stevens addressed the majority's interpretation of
the word "possible interceptions" in the third clause of § 2232(c).180
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority view that "possible interceptions" also includes expired wiretaps.' 8 ' According to Justice Stevens, the phrase "such interceptions" in the second clause refers to
the acts that violate the statute, and "such interceptions" only includes
170 Id. at 2366 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905) (Holmes, J.)).
171 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
172 Id (Stevens,J, concurring and dissenting) (citing Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S.
6, 14-15 (1978)).
173 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
174 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
175 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
176 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
177 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
178 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
179 Id. (Stevens,J., concurring and dissenting) (citing United States v. X-citement Video,
Inc., 115 S.Ct. 464, 467 (1994)).
180 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
181 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
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applications for interceptions or authorized wiretaps.' 8 2 Justice Stevens argued that Congress used the phrase "possible interceptions" in
18 3
the third clause to place a temporal limitation on potential liability.
The phrase "possible interceptions" applies only to present or pending authorizations and not to expired wiretaps. 84 Otherwise, a person could violate the statute by disclosing an expired ten year old
application or authorization. 8 5 Justice Stevens reasoned that this absurd result is avoided if the phrase "possible interceptions" is properly
86
understood as a temporal limitation on potential liability.'
Using a narrow interpretation of § 2232(c), Justice Stevens reasoned thatJudge Aguilar did not violate § 2232 (c) since Judge Aguilar
87
disclosed an expired wiretap that is not protected under the statute.
C.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE/DISSENT

Justice Scalia' 8 8 concurred with the majority's opinion regarding
§ 2232(c), but dissented from the majority's opinion regarding the
Omnibus Clause of § 1503.189 He reasoned that the nexus requirement is not a proper interpretation of the statute. 190
Justice Scalia began his opinion by addressing the constrution of
the Omnibus Clause. 191 Based on Pettibone,Justice Scalia agreed with
the majority opinion that a person must have knowledge of ajudicial
proceeding and intend to interfere with this proceeding. 19 2 Justice
Scalia, however, strongly disagreed with the majority's use of a nexus
requirement to restrain the scope of the Omnibus Clause. 19 3 He argued that the majority incorrectly used the rule of lenity since the
plain language of the Omnibus Clause is clear regarding the reach of
the statute. Rather, the majority was "importing extra-textual requirements to limit the reach of the federal criminal statute." 19 4 By limiting the Omnibus Clause to acts having the "natural and probable
effect" of interfering with the administration of justice, Justice Scalia
argued that the majority changed the plain meaning of the clause by
effectively limiting the clause to cover only those acts that would be
182 Id. (Stevens, J.,
183 Id. (Stevens, J.,
184 Id. (Stevens, J.,
185 Id. (Stevens, J.,
186 Id. (Stevens, J.,
187 Id. (Stevens, J.,
188 Justice Thomas

189
190
191
192
193
194

concurring
concurring
concurring
concurring
concurring
concurring
andJustice

and dissenting).
and dissenting).
and dissenting).
and dissenting).
and dissenting).
and dissenting).
Kennedy joined justice Scalia.

Id. at 2367 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 2368 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
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successful at obstructing justice. 9 5
According to Justice Scalia, a person violates the Omnibus Clause
by "endeavoring" to do so, and not by whether the endeavor would be
successful or not. 19 6 The use of the word "endeavor" in the Omnibus
Clause describes any effort or assay to accomplish the evil purpose that
the section was enacted to prevent. 19 7 Moreover, it is immaterial
whether the effort to obstruct a pending proceeding can actually be
achieved. 198 The Omnibus Clause reaches all purposeful efforts with
the intent to obstructjustice. 19 9 Thus, Justice Scalia reasoned that the
Omnibus Clause reaches any act performed with the intention of obstructing justice and not just to those acts that have the natural and
20 0
probable consequence of obstructing justice.
Based on his interpretation of the Omnibus Clause, Justice Scalia
argued that Judge Aguilar violated the Omnibus Clause.2 0 ' Judge
Aguilar knew that a grand jury was investigating a conspiracy charge
against him.2 0 2 Thus, Judge Aguilar knew that his false statements to
the FBI agents might be provided to the grand jury. 20 3 Justice Scalia
reasoned that a reasonable juror could have concluded that Judge
Aguilar had corruptly endeavored to obstruct justice because Judge
Aguilar made false statements to the FBI agents with the intent to ob20 4
struct the grand jury investigation.
V. ANALYSIS
A.

§ 1503

The Supreme Court correctly concluded that making false statements to an investigating agent who might testify before a grand jury
does not violate the Omnibus Clause of § 1503. In reaching its conclusion, the Court used the rule of lenity to affirm the use of the
nexus requirement as a proper approach to interpret the Omnibus
Clause. 20 5 By affirming the use of the nexus requirement, however,
195 Id. (Scalia, J,

concurring and dissenting).
196 Id. at 2367 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
197 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing United States v. Russell, 255 U.S.
138, 143 (1921)) (emphasis added).
198 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.
323, 333 (1966)).
199 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d
1365, 1370 (6th Cir. 1994).
200 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
201 Id. at 2369 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
202 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
203 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added).
204
205

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 2362.
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the Court changed the plain meaning of the Omnibus Clause. 20 6 The
Court essentially read the phrase "endeavor to obstructjustice" out of
the Omnibus Clause and replaced it with the phrase "efforts that have
20 7
the natural and probable consequence of obstruction of justice."
This interpretation is inconsistent with both the plain language of and
congressional intent behind the Omnibus Clause which prohibits any
endeavor to obstructjustice. Rather than using the rule of lenity, the
Court should have used stare decisis to reach its conclusion that making false statements to an investigating agent does not violate the Omnibus Clause.
1. Plain Language
Interpretation of a statute begins by looking at the plain language
used in the statute.20 8 The plain language used in the Omnibus
Clause indicates that Congress intended to proscribe all efforts with
the intent to obstruct justice whatever the potential success of the efforts used.
The Omnibus Clause of § 1503 provides: "[w]hoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence,
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice shall be fined
...
"209 As defined in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, "en2 10
deavor" means to achieve or reach, or to work with a set purpose.
The meaning of the word endeavor has remained essentially the same
since the early 1800s. 211 As defined in A Complete and UniversalEnglish
Dictionaryin 1809, "to endeavour" means to exert power, in order to
gain some end; to make an attempt; to try. 212 Thus, by using the word
"endeavor," Congress intended to proscribe any corrupt effort with
the purpose to either obstruct, impede or influence the due administration ofjustice. Congress however did not use language in the statute which required that the efforts should be capable of successfully
obstructing justice.
By using the nexus requirement, the Supreme Court changed the
plain meaning of the word endeavor as previously used by Congress.
The Court now holds that an "endeavor," as used in the Omnibus
206 See id at 2368 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
207 Id.

208 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
209 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994) (emphasis added).
210 WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICaONARY 410 (1991),
211 The word "endeavor" was spelled "endeavour" in 1809. A COMPLETE AND UNrVERSAL

ENGLISH DICTIONARY 312 (1809).
212 I.
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Clause, must have the "natural and probable consequence" of obstructingjustice. 2 13 As defined in Webster's Ninth New CollegiateDictionary, "natural" means happening in the ordinary course of things, and
"probable" means likely to be or become true.2 1 4 In essence, an effort
that would have the "natural and probable consequence" of obstructing justice is equivalent to an effort that if carried out, would be
"successful" in obstructing justice.
The Court's nexus requirement that a person's efforts be the type
that would be "successful" in obstructing justice is not consistent with
the plain language used by Congress in the Omnibus Clause. The
plain language of the statute prohibits any effort with the evil intent to
obstruct justice and places no limits on the potential success of the
efforts used. As Justice Scalia noted, "the Court effectively reads the
word 'endeavor'

. .

2 15
. out of the [O]mnibus [C]lause."

2. Legislative History
The Omnibus Clause of § 1503, which has its origins in Section 2
of the Act of March 2, 1831, should not be narrowly construed as the
Supreme Court has done by creating the nexus requirement, Based
on the legislative history, Congress intended that Section 2 should be
broadly construed.2 1 6 The purpose behind Section 2 was to prohibit
any attempt to obstruct justice made outside the courtroom. 2 1 7 Pun21 8
ishment for these attempts required indictment and trial by jury.
By contrast, Congress intended that Section 1 (the predecessor statute
to § 401) should be narrowly construed since this section involved
contempts of court occurring within the courtroom and subject to
2 19
summary punishment.
Both the congressional intent behind the Act of March 2, 1831,
and the manner in which the legislation was passed indicate that Section 1 was to be narrowly construed and Section 2 was to be broadly
construed. Congress introduced the legislation in response to the
Senate's acquittal ofJudge Peck. 220 Its purpose was to narrowly limit
the rights of inferior court judges to use summary punishment for
contempts of court occurring within the courtroom. 22 1 The original
legislation presented to the House contained only Section 1 involving
213 United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2362 (1995).
214 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIcnoNARY 788, 937 (1991).
215 Aguilar, 115 S. CL at 2368 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
216 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941); Nelles & King, supra
217 Nelles & King, supranote 22, at 530-31.
218 Id.
219 Ny 313 U.S. at 47-49.
220 Id. at 45-46.
221 Id.

note 22, at 531.
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summary punishment. 2 22 After the House passed Section 1, the Senate amended the House legislation by adding Section 2 involving contempts of court occurring outside the courtroom punishable by
indictment and trial byjury. 223 The timing of the legislation indicates
that Congress was concerned that Section 1, by itself, was too narrow
to be the only law to cover contempts of court.2 2 4 Thus, Congress
added Section 2 to broadly cover all contempts of court not covered
by the narrowly defined Section 1.225 Furthermore, Section 2 need
not require a narrow construction since this section has the safeguard
of punishment with trial by jury rather than by summary
226
punishment.
The language used by Congress further supports the argument
that Section 1 should be narrowly construed and Section 2 should be
broadly construed. The language in Section 1 specifically listed the
violations that were considered contempts of court and required that
there had to be actual obstruction ofjustice to justify summary judgment. By contrast, Section 2 not only listed specific violations, but
also prohibited any effort to obstruct or impede justice. Thus, any
effort to obstruct justice would violate the statute even if no obstruction of justice results. By using the word "endeavor," Congress attempted to cover those means of interference which the draftsmen
2 27
did not have the foresight to enumerate.
Congress intended Section 2 of the Act of 1831-the predecessor
to the Omnibus Clause of § 1503-to broadly cover efforts to obstruct
justice occurring outside the courtroom. A narrow construction of
the Omnibus Clause using the nexus requirement, which restricts efforts to obstruct justice to those efforts that would be successful, is
inconsistent with congressional intent.
3. Stare Decisis
The Supreme Court used the nexus requirement to decide that
making false statements to an investigating agent who might testify
before a grand jury does not violate the Omnibus Clause. Besides being inconsistent with the plain language and congressional intent, the
nexus requirement is also inconsistent with stare decisis.
By contrast, prior Supreme Court decisions are consistent with a
broad interpretation of the Omnibus Clause. In Osborn v. United
222 Nelles & King, supra note 22, at 530-31.
223 Id. at 531 n.24.

224 See id.
225 Id.
226 Cf Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 49 (1941).
227 See United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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States,2 28 the Court defined "endeavor" in the Omnibus Clause as "any
effort or essay to do or accomplish the evil purpose that the section
was enacted to prevent."2 29 More importantly, the Court stated that
"[t] he section is not directed at success in corrupting Uustice], but at
the 'endeavor' to do so." 230 Thus, the Osborn Court held that what was

important was not that the act to obstruct justice was successful, but
that the person had the purpose of obstructing justice through his
efforts.2 3 1 The Court's nexus requirement is not consistent with the
broad definition of the word "endeavor" used by the Court in Osborn.
Instead of creating a nexus requirement, the Court should have
used stare decisis to answer the question whether making false statements to an investigating agent violates the Omnibus Clause. The
Court in Pettibone v. United States23 2 ruled that to violate Revised Stat.
§ 5399 (the predecessor statute to § 1503), a person must have knowledge of the judicial proceeding and intend to obstruct the proceeding.23 3

Based on the Pettibone decision, the Government must

establish three core elements to successfully convict a defendant
under § 1503: (1) there must be ajudicial proceeding; (2) the person
must have knowledge of the judicial proceeding; and (3) the person
must intend to obstruct the judicial proceeding.2 34 The Pettibonedecision is consistent with a broad interpretation of the Omnibus Clause
because it does not place any limits on what constitutes endeavors to
obstruct justice.
Based on the Pettibonedecision, making false statements to an investigating agent who might testify before a grand jury does not violate the Omnibus Clause because it does not involve a judicial
proceeding and it does not show an intent to obstructjustice. 235 First,
an investigating agent is not part of a judicial proceeding. An investigating agent is part of a government agency which does not administer justice within the meaning of § 1503.236 Second, the requirement
that a person intend to obstruct the judicial proceeding is also lacking. When a person makes false statements to an investigating agent,
that person's actions show an intent only to obstruct the investigation
of a government agency. An intent to obstruct ajudicial proceeding is
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235

385 U.S. 323 (1966).
Id. at 333.
Id.
I
148 U.S. 197 (1893).
Id at 206.
United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 977 (5th Cir. 1989).
See United States v. Scoratow, 137 F. Supp. 620, 622 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (holding that

making false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation does not violate § 1503).
236 Id
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absent since the person cannot be certain if the investigating agent
will testify before the judicial proceeding. Thus, Judge Aguilar did
not violate the Omnibus Clause by making false statements to an investigating agent who was not part of a judicial proceeding. Moreover, Judge Aguilar could not be certain that his statements would be
given to the grand jury since the investigating agents did not identify
themselves as an arm of the grand jury proceeding. Although Judge
Aguilar might have violated a statute dealing with obstruction of a gov237
ernment agency, he did not violate the Omnibus Clause.
4. Rule of Lenity of Nexus Requirement
Based on the rule of lenity, the Supreme Court accepted the
nexus requirement developed in lower court decisions as a reasonable
interpretation of the Omnibus Clause. 238 A court should reserve the
rule of lenity for those sitdations in which a reasonable doubt persists
about a statute's intended scope after resort to the plain language and
motivating policies behind the statute. 23 9 The rule of lenity is unnecessary to determine the reach of the Omnibus Clause since the plain
language and motivating policies of § 1503 are clear regarding its limits. The plain language of the Omnibus Clause indicates that Congress intended to prohibit any corrupt effort to obstruct justice.
Furthermore, Congress enacted the predecessor statute to § 1503 as a
broad prohibition against all possible efforts to obstruct justice occurring outside the courtroom.
In its decision, the Court cited lower court rulings that have developed the nexus requirement. 240 The reasoning of the lower courts
that have adopted the nexus requirement however, is incorrect. In
United States v. Thomas,2 41 the Eleventh Circuit defined the nexus requirement as a reasonable limit on the Omnibus Clause. 242 The Eleventh Circuit based its decision in part on two early Supreme Court
decisions-In re Michael and Ex parte Hudgings.243 In both cases, the
Supreme Court narrowly defined the circumstances under which perjury could be punished as an obstruction of justice. 2 44 In both of
these cases, however, the Court was dealing with summary punish237 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (prohibiting making false statements to federal agencies or
departments).
238 United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2362 (1995).
239 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).

240 Id.
241 916 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1990).
242 1d&at 652.
243 Id. (citing In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378
(1919)).
244 In re ichael, 326 U.S. at 228; Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. at 382-83.
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ment under the predecessor statute to 18 U.S.C. § 401-not the predecessor statute of the Omnibus Clause.2 45 Under § 401, a judge has
the discretionary power to place the defendant in jail for a contempt
of court without a trial by jury. Consequently, although a narrow interpretation might be appropriate for § 401, it is not appropriate for
the Omnibus Clause of § 1503 since the defendant has the protection
of a trial by jury before being punished.
B.

§ 2232(c)

The Supreme Court correctly decided thatJudge Aguilar violated
§ 2232(c) by disclosing an expired wiretap. Both the plain language
of § 2232(c) and the legislative history behind the statute indicate that
Congress intended that a person would violate the statute by disclosing an expired wiretap. The plain language of § 2232(c) indicates
that Congress intended to prohibit the disclosure of information regarding a government wiretap whether or not the wiretap is a factual
possibility.2 46 Thus, a person can violate § 2232(c) by disclosing nonexistent wiretaps-including expired wiretaps. 2 47 Furthermore, the
legislative history behind § 2232(c) indicates that Congress intended
to protect the secrecy of government wiretaps by punishing those who
disclose the wiretap to the intended target.248 Prohibiting the disclosure of an expired wiretap protects the secrecy of governmental investigations that use both existing and expired wiretaps and is thus
consistent with congressional intent.
1.

PlainLanguage of § 2232(c)

Interpretation of a statute begins by looking at the plain language
used in the statute.2 49 Based on the plain language of § 2232(c), a
person can violate the statute by disclosing information regarding a
wiretap that is not factually possible-including an expired wiretap.
The language of § 2232(c) in part states that " [w] hoever, having
knowledge that a federal investigative or law enforcement officer has
been authorized or has applied for authorization ... in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such interception gives notice or attempts
to give notice of the possible interception to any person .... ,,250
Based on the first clause of § 2232 (c), a person can violate the statute
by attempting to disclose a wiretap that is nonexistent. Once a person
245 1&j

246 United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2364 (1995).
247 Id
248 S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986).
249 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
250 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c) (1994).
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has knowledge that an officer "has been authorized" or "has applied
for authorization," a person violates § 2232(c) by attempting to disclose this information. 25 1 The offense is complete though the wiretap
may not be put into place. 2 52 For example, a judge may either deny
the application for the wiretap, or the authorized wiretap may not be
used by the investigating agency. In either case, a person, with the
intent to obstruct a wiretap violates § 2232(c) by attempting to disclose information regarding a nonexistent wiretap.
Use of the phrase "possible interception" in the third clause gives
further support to the argument that Congress did not intend that a
wiretap has to be factually possible. As defined in Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary, "possible" means "capable of existing" or "something that may or may not occur."253 Thus, a person can violate
§ 2232(c) by disclosing a wiretap that may not occur, or in other
words, one that is not factually possible.
The plain language used in the first and third clauses of
§ 2232(c) shows that Congress did not intend to prohibit only disclosure of factually possible wiretaps. Rather, Congress intended to prohibit a person from disclosing information learned from an
application for or from an authorization for a wiretap. If at the time
of disclosure, the wiretap has not yet been put into place, or will not
be put into place, or has expired, a person still violates § 2232(c) by
disclosing information to the original target of the wiretap.
2. Legislative History of § 2232(c)
Besides the plain language, the legislative history and motivating
policies behind § 2232(c) are also important aids for interpreting the
scope of a criminal statute. 254 The legislative history behind § 2232 (c)
indicates that prohibiting disclosure of an expired wiretap is consis251 Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2364.
252 Id.
253 WEBSTER's NiNTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 918 (1991).
254 See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 113 (1990) (quoting United States v. Brainblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1955)). In Moska, the defendants had purchased used cars in

Pennsylvania, rolled back the cars' odometers, and transported the cars to Virginia. Id.at
105. Virginia authorities, unaware of the alterations, issued Virginia titles incorporating
the false mileage figures. Id at 106. The cars were then taken back to Pennsylvania and
sold to unsuspecting customers. Id Under 18 U.S.C. § 2314, a person is prohibited from
transporting "in interstate ... commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities ... knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered or counterfeited." Id The defendants claimed that the titles were genuine titles issued by Virginia
and not falsely made. Id. The Court held that the defendants had violated § 2314 even
though the titles were genuine because the titles contained false information. Id at 114.
The Court reasoned that a broad interpretation is consistent with both the plain language
of § 2314 and with congressional intent behind the statute. Id
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tent with congressional intent behind § 2232 (c) to protect the secrecy
of government wiretaps by punishing those who disclose a wiretap
2 55
during an investigation.
When the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was enacted, Congress included three measures in the Act that were
designed to strengthen government wiretap laws from a law enforcement perspective. 25 6 The first two measures expanded the list of felonies for which a wiretap could be issued and included provisions
making it easier for law enforcement officials to deal with targets who
repeatedly changed telephones to thwart interceptions.2 5 7 The third
measure, § 2232(c), was designed to protect the secrecy of governmental electronic surveillance by creating criminal penalties for those
who disclose the wiretap to the intended target.2 58 Senator Thurmond stated: "[t]hese provisions will be particularly helpful to the jus2' 59
tice Department in its fight against drug trafficking.
Prohibiting disclosure of an expired wiretap is consistent with
congressional intent to protect the secrecy of government wiretaps because some government investigations simultaneously use both existing and expired wiretaps. When the Government decides to use a
wiretap as part of an investigation, the Government must submit an
application for the wiretap.2 60 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2518, a judge can
authorize a wiretap that will have a thirty day limit before expiration. 26 ' If the wiretap is needed for longer than thirty days, the Government can petition the judge for an extension. 2 62 For instance, if
the Government needs to change the number of wiretaps, or change
the persons under surveillance, the Government must submit an application for a new wiretap. 2 63 In the meantime, the original wiretap
will expire. 264 Consequently, the investigation will simultaneously include both an existing and an expired wiretap.2 65 Furthermore, if an
application for an extension of an existing wiretap is not granted by
the end of the thirty day period, the wiretap will expire until the extension is granted.2 66 Should court delays, personnel problems or
other logistic problems occur, the order granting an extension may
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come days and even weeks after the thirty day expiration. 267 Thus,
technically, the wiretap will be expired until the extension is granted.
Since some governmental investigations can include expired
wiretaps, allowing a person to disclose an expired wiretap would endanger the secrecy of the existing wiretaps. A person could disclose
the expired wiretap to the interceptee, compromise the secrecy of the
continuing investigation, and escape punishment because the disclosure involved an expired wiretap. For example, in this case, Judge
Aguilar disclosed a wiretap nine months after it had expired. 268 The
Government, however, was using a new wiretap as part of the continuing investigation of Chapman. 2 69 Thus, Judge Aguilar-whose intent
was to obstruct the wiretap-compromised the secrecy of the government's ongoing investigation of Chapman. If disclosure of an expired
wiretap were not prohibited, Judge Aguilar would have compromised
the secrecy of the wiretap and also have escaped punishment. Thus,
an interpretation of § 2232(c) which prohibits disclosure of an expired wiretap furthers congressional intent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court correctly concluded that 1) under the Omnibus Clause of § 1503, making false statements to an investigating
agent who may testify before a grand jury does not violate the Omnibus Clause; and 2) under § 2232 (c) a person who discloses an expired
wiretap violates the statute. However, the Court should have used different reasoning concerning its interpretation of the Omnibus Clause.
In reaching its conclusion concerning the Omnibus Clause, the
Court-using the rule of lenity-affirmed the use of the "nexus" requirement as a proper interpretation of the clause. Under the nexus
requirement, a person's efforts to obstructjustice must have the "natural and probable consequence" of obstructing justice to violate the
Omnibus Clause. The nexus requirement, however, is inconsistent
with the plain language of the statute and with congressional intent.
The Omnibus Clause prohibits any effort or essay to obstruct the due
administration ofjustice whatever the possible outcome. Rather than
using the nexus requirement, the Court should have used stare decisis
to reach the conclusion that making false statements to an investigating agent who might testify before a grand jury does not violate the
Omnibus Clause. Based on stare decisis, efforts to obstruct an investigating agent do not violate the Omnibus Clause unless the agent is
267 Id.
268 United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.d 1475, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
269
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part of a judicial proceeding.
Regarding § 2232(c), the Court correctly concluded that disclosure of an expired wiretap violates the statute. Based on the plain
language, a person violates the statute by disclosing an expired wiretap. This conclusion is correct since the plain language of § 2232(c)
does not indicate that the wiretap has to be factually possible. Furthermore, this broad interpretation is consistent with congressional
intent to protect the secrecy of governmental wiretaps.
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